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Abstract—As a result of the GDPR and the ePrivacy Direc-
tive, European users encounter cookie banners on almost every
website. Many of such banners are implemented by Consent
Management Providers (CMPs), who respect the IAB Europe’s
Transparency and Consent Framework (TCF). Via cookie ban-
ners, CMPs collect and disseminate user consent to third parties.
In this work, we systematically study IAB Europe’s TCF and
analyze consent stored behind the user interface of TCF cookie
banners. We analyze the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive to
identify legal violations in implementations of cookie banners
based on the storage of consent and detect such violations by
crawling 22 949 European websites. With two automatic and
semi-automatic crawl campaigns, we detect violations, and we
find that: 175 websites register positive consent even if the user
has not made their choice; 236 websites nudge the users towards
accepting consent by pre-selecting options; and 39 websites store
a positive consent even if the user has explicitly opted out.
Performing extensive tests on 560 websites, we find at least one
violation in 54% of them. Finally, we provide a browser extension
to facilitate manual detection of violations for regular users and
Data Protection Authorities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s web advertising ecosystem heavily relies on con-
tinuous data collection and tracking that allows advertising
companies, as well as data brokers to continuously profit from
collecting a vast amount of data associated to the users. In May
2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [46]
changed the rules on consent, shaking the tracking and ad-
vertisement industry in its practices. The ePrivacy Directive,
amended in 2009 (ePD, also known as “cookie law”)1 [45]
made it mandatory to collect user’s consent before any access
or storage of non-mandatory data (not strictly necessary for
the service requested by the user) In case of websites, the
consent is usually presented in the form of cookie banners,
or cookie notices that inform the user of data collection and
should provide a meaningful choice on whether to accept or
reject such collection. The website visitors in the European
Union observe such banners on many websites they visit today.
Various research studies looked into detection and mea-
surement of web tracking technologies that perform silent data
collection without user’s explicit consent [42], [38], [11], [2],
[37], [34], [40]. Several some recent works [36], [8], [48], [44]
have been measuring the impact of GDPR on the web tracking
and advertising ecosystem. Researchers [36] observed a 22%
drop in the amount of third-party cookies before and after
1The upgrade of the ePD into a regulation is currently under discussion.
the GDPR, but only a 2% drop in third-party content. Other
works recently measured the prevalence of cookie banners and
showed that the amount of banners increased over time [8]
after the GDPR. Legal scholars and authorities and computer
science researchers independently noticed that some banners
do not allow users to refuse data collection, and raised this in
various studies [8], [33], [3], [50]. Several recent works [47],
[48], [44] measured the impact of choices set in cookie
banners on tracking: upon accepting and rejecting the consent
proposed in a cookie banner, researchers evaluated the number
of cookies set in the browser and the number of third party
tracking requests across websites. Latest work [49] evaluated
whether the design of cookie banners made an impact on how
users would interact with them.
Although many research efforts took place after the GDPR
to detect and analyze cookie banners and their impact on
tracking technologies and on the users, no study has analyzed
what actually happens behind the user interface of cookie
banners yet. It is unclear how to meaningfully compare the
interface of the banners shown to the users to the actual consent
that banners store and transmit to the third parties present on
the website. Our work is motivated by the following questions:
Do banners actually respect user’s choice made in the user
interface? Do banners silently register a positive consent even
if the user has not made their choice? Do they nudge the user
to accept everything by pre-choosing a positive consent?
Answering such questions, ensuring a proper functionality
and legal compliance of a cookie banner is usually left to be
handled by the website publisher and is completely obscure
for the website visitor.
In reaction to the GDPR, the European branch of the
Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB Europe), an advertising
business organization, produced the Transparency and Consent
Framework (TCF) [25] to structure the practices of actors
of the tracking and advertisement industry regarding consent
collection. Notably, they introduced the notion of Consent
Management Providers (CMPs) – actors in charge of collecting
consent from the end-user, and redistributing this consent to
advertisers. Figure 1 shows a typical example of a cookie
banner implemented by a CMP that allows the user to agree
or disagree with five predefined purposes of data processing.
Contributions. Thanks to the open specification of the
TCF, we perform the first systematic comparison of the consent
chosen by the users and the consent stored by the CMPs, which
is further transmitted to third-party advertisers present on a
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Fig. 1: A cookie banner on tinyurl.com of a Consent Man-
agement Provider that implements IAB Europe’s Transparency
& Consent Framework (TCF).
website. With our analysis of consent, we are able to measure
both the GDPR and the ePD compliance of cookie banners
implemented in the TCF. Our main contributions are:
1) We design an automatic method to detect the presence
of a cookie banner developed by a Consent Management
Providers (CMP) (Section IV-B). We automatically detect
1 426 websites with such banners.
2) We develop and use a methodology to intercept the con-
sent stored in the browser (Section IV-C). By analyzing
the content of consent, we bring transparency by assigning
the responsibility for each consent on the companies
behind CMPs and publishers.
3) By collaborating with legal scholars, we thoroughly an-
alyze GDPR, ePrivacy directive and other legal texts to
identify four legal violations specific to cookie banners:
Consent stored before choice, No way to opt out, Pre-
selected choices and Non-respect of choice (Section III).
4) We develop a method to evaluate regulatory compliance
of websites (Section IV-E). We quantify the identified vi-
olations on 1 426 websites by automatic-, semi-automatic
crawls and manual detection (Section VII-A). By analyz-
ing cookie banners’ design on a subset of 560 websites
(from countries whose language the authors speak), we
find that 236 (47%) websites nudge the users towards ac-
ceptance by pre-selecting options, while 38 (7%) websites
do not provide any means to refuse consent. By analyzing
the consent stored in the browser, we automatically detect
175 out of 1 426 (12%) websites that store a positive
consent before user has made any choice in the cookie
banner, while 39 out of 560 (8%) websites store an all –
accepting consent even if the user has explicitly opted out
in the cookie banner interface. In total, we find at least
one violation in 305 out of 560 websites (54%).
5) We measure the problem of escalation of shared consent
between CMPs (Section VII-B). The TCF allows different
CMPs and publishers to rely on each other’s consent, set
in a shared cookie. We observe that 3 websites store a
positive consent before user action in the shared cookie,
while 20 websites store a positive consent in a shared
cookie even if the user has explicitly opted out. Such
invalid consent can be reused by any CMP and publisher
and therefore escalates non-compliance to other websites.
6) We quantify third-party requests that transmit consent and
that belong to known third-party tracking services (Sec-
Fig. 2: Consent Management Providers (CMPs) under IAB
Europe’s TCF.
tion VIII). We observe that various third-parties receive
consent with third-party requests, where the origin of
consent does not necessarily match the CMP present on
the website. Such consents are set before user action on
69 websites and despite user refusal on 38 websites. We
observe that the number of third-party tracking requests
increases both after positive and after negative consent.
To measure compliance, we have designed two tools.
Cookinspect is a Selenium and Chromium-based crawler which
automatically and semi-automatically visits websites, logs
stored consent and intercepts transmission of consent to third
parties. Cookie glasses [1] is a publicly available browser
extension for Google Chrome and Firefox that allows users
to detect a CMP that implements a TCF banner and see if
their choice is correctly transmitted to advertisers by CMPs.
II. IAB EUROPE’S TRANSPARENCY AND CONSENT
FRAMEWORK (TCF)
The third-party advertising and tracking ecosystem con-
tains different actors. Publishers provide free websites to users
and include third-party advertising content. Advertisers and
trackers collect users’ data and display ads. Finally, users
consume free content. With the arrival of the GDPR, it became
evident that the different actors of this ecosystem were not
equipped to properly collect and exchange user’s consent.
In April 2018, IAB (Interactive Advertising Bureau) Eu-
rope published the Transparency & Consent Framework (TCF)
– a technical specification that allows third-parties and publish-
ers to collect and exchange user’s consent to data collection
and the use of cookies2. The TCF was presented as a way
to help digital advertising industry to “interpret and comply
with EU rules on data protection and privacy – notably
the GDPR” [25]. IAB Europe introduced new actors, called
Consent Management Providers (CMPs), who are responsible
for collecting the end user’s consent, storing it in the user’s
browser and implementing methods to respond to advertisers’
queries regarding this consent.
2In this work, we study version 1.1 of the TCF. Even though IAB Europe
published TCF version 2 on August 21st 2019, we have not observed its
application in the wild, and therefore did not address it in this work.
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Fig. 3: The methods to share consent in IAB Europe TCF.
{”created”: ”2018-11-27 17:24:14”,
”cmpId”: 139,
”allowedPurposeIds”: [1,2,3,4,5],
”allowedVendorIds”: [1,2,3 ... ,554,555,556], ...}
Fig. 4: Example of a decoding of a consent string.
Figure 2 summarizes the updated interaction of CMPs with
publishers, users and advertisers. To become a part of the TCF,
each CMP and advertiser must register with IAB Europe. As
a result, IAB Europe maintains: (1) a public list of CMPs [22]
that participate in the frameworks (alongside identifiers, called
CMP IDs), and (2) a Global Vendor List (GVL) [26] – a
public list of registered advertisers (called “vendors”). As of
October 25th 2019, there are 117 CMPs in the CMP list 550
advertisers in the GVL list. While registering in GVL, among
other information, each advertiser must declare one or more
of the five pre-defined purposes for which the data is collected
and for which purposes consent will be used – these are the
purposes the user usually sees in the interface of the cookie
banner (see Figure 1). Table IX in Appendix A shows the full
list and description of all predefined purposes.
1) Consent String: The TCF defines a standard format
for consent [25], called consent string. This string contains
advertisers the user consented their data to be sent to, the
purposes of data processing the user consent to, and the
CMP identifier, along with other information. This format is a
slightly-modified version of base64 of an array of values. IAB
provides a script to decode this format [27].
Figure 4 shows a decoding of the consent string
“BOX5uluOX5uluCLAAAENB6-AAAAizAAA”, obtained on
telerama.fr. The cmpId is an identifier of a CMP
from IAB Europe CMP list [22] responsible for storing a
consent string; allowedPurposeIds are the identifiers of
the five pre-defined TCF purposes of data processing; and
allowedVendorIds are the identifiers of advertisers from
the GVL [26]. Note that any third party can identify the CMP
that registered the consent string by comparing the cmpId
field of the consent string to the public list of CMPs [22].
2) Consent Storage: The TCF does not impose any par-
ticular mechanism for storing user’s consent in the browser.
It only suggests that CMPs use a “first-party service-specific
cookie”, without further details [24].
As one way to implement consent storage, the TCF pro-
poses CMPs to store a consent string in a cookie, named
“euconsent” in a subdomain of consensu.org owned by
IAB (we call it “shared cookie” in the rest of the paper)3.
Since each CMP registered in the TCF has access to its own
subdomain (e.g. ad.consensu.org), it can host scripts in
their subdomain to read and modify the shared cookie.
3) Consent Sharing: Once consent is stored in the user’s
browser, any advertiser (or, more generally, any third party)
present on a page can query a CMP to obtain the consent that
was given by the user. In the TCF, consent sharing can be done
via: standard APIs, a shared cookie, URL-based methods, and
a non-standard method (safeFrames). We present each consent
sharing mechanism in more details below. Figure 3 graphically
presents how each method obtains a consent string.
Standard APIs. The TCF specifies APIs that each CMP
must implement – such API allows any third party advertiser
present on a publisher website to verify whether a CMP has
already stored a consent on a given website. In particular, each
CMP in the framework must implement:
(i) a javascript function called “__cmp()”, that scripts in
a first-party position can call directly,
(ii) an iframe named “__cmpLocator”, that iframes in
a third-party position can communicate with using the
postMessage API using a __cmpCall function.
Shared cookie. As explained above, CMPs can store
consent in a shared cookie on the .consensu.org domain,
that any other CMP can read.
URL-based methods. The TCF specifies [29] other meth-
ods to send consent to third-parties devoid of possibility
to execute JavaScript, such as tracking pixels. First, con-
sent can be passed: through GET requests, in a predefined
“gdpr_consent” parameter. Second, using an HTTP redi-
recting mechanism, that we show in steps Ê-Ì in Fig-
ure 3. Third parties can issue a request to a subdomain of
.consensu.org, such as ad.consensu.org, provid-
ing a final destination URL as a parameter of the request,
such as ad.com. Because browsers automatically attach the
cookie of .consensu.org to the request, the CMP owning
ad.consensu.org obtains a shared cookie (step Ê). The
CMP then responds with the “302 Redirect” status, indicating
ad.com as a destination URL and attaching the cookie value
3TCF mentions that when website-specific cookie and shared cookies are
both defined, the website-specific cookie will be used.
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in the parameters (step Ë). Finally, ad.com receives the
shared cookie (step Ì).
Non-standard method: SafeFrames Finally, the TCF
proposes an additional non-standard method to share consent:
safeFrames. A SafeFrame [20] is an API-enabled iframe
(implemented via specific first-party scripts) that controls the
communication between the webpage content and third-party
ads. SafeFrame proxy obtains consent by calling to the stan-
dard __cmp() function.
III. GDPR AND EPRIVACY VIOLATIONS
In our work, we focus on the European regulatory frame-
work of data protection and privacy. In May 2018, the
GDPR [46] clarified the rules regarding processing of personal
data in any environment [17]. Article 4(11) and Article 7 of
GDPR have set precise requirements on valid user consent:
it must be free, specific, informed, unambiguous, explicit,
revocable, given prior to any data collection, and asked in a
readable and accessible manner [14]. The ePrivacy Directive
(ePD, also known as “cookie law) [12] “particularizes” the
GDPR with respect to the processing of personal data in the
electronic communication sector, such as websites. Due to the
ePD [12, Article 5(3)], and according to the European Data
Protection Board (EDPB) and Information Commissioner’s
Office (ICO, the UK’s DPA), website publishers have to rely on
user consent when they collect and process personal data using
non-mandatory (non strictly necessary for the service requested
by the user) cookies or other tracking technologies [16], [30].
As a result of a deep legal analysis of both the GDPR, ePD
and corresponding legal texts and opinions of Data Protection
Authorities, we identify four legal violations specific to cookie
banners that implement IAB Europe TCF framework.
Consent stored before choice: The CMP stores a positive
consent before the user has made their choice in the banner.
Therefore, when advertisers request for consent, the CMP
responds with the consent string even though the user has not
clicked on a banner and has not made their choice.
This practice violates the requirement of prior consent
which demands that website publishers need to request consent
to users (1) prior to any processing activity of personal
data [14], and (2) before loading tracking technologies ac-
cording to Article 5(3) of ePD [12]. This requirement is further
imposed in the guidance from the EDPB [18], the ICO [30] and
the CNIL (French Data Protection Authority) [5]. Moreover,
the TCF’s policy document explicitly states that “a CMP will
generate consent signals only on the basis of a clear affirmative
action taken by a user” [23].
No way to opt out: The banner does not offer a way to
refuse consent. The most common case is a banner simply
informing the users about the site’s use of cookies4.
This practice configures a violation of the requirement
of unambiguous consent [46, Art.4(11)] stipulating that in
order for the user consent to be valid, the user must give an
unambiguous indication through a clear and affirmative action
of his choice [12, Art. 5(3)]. Moreover, Recital 66 of the ePD
4In previous works, this category has been named as ”No option” in
Degeling et al. [8] and as ”OnlyAccept” in Sanchez-Rola et al.[44]
is quite explicit while directing that the methods of offering
the right to refuse should be as user-friendly as possible. In
its guidelines, the EDPB [18] states that “consent mechanism
should present the user with a real and meaningful choice
regarding cookies on the entry page”, and that users “should
have an opportunity to freely choose between the option to
accept some or all cookies or to decline all or some cookies.”
In this line, we posit that cookie banner design must offer users
an option to either accept or refuse consent.
Pre-selected choices: The banner gives user a choice
between one or more purposes or vendors, however some of
the purposes or vendors are pre-selected: pre-ticked boxes or
sliders set to “accept”.
Preselected choices consist in a direct violation of the re-
quirement of unambiguous consent [46, Article 4(11)]. Recital
32 of GDPR reads further that consent given in the form of a
preselected tick in a checkbox does not imply active behaviour
of the user and that pre-ticked boxes do not constitute consent.
The EDPB [14] indicates that pre-ticked boxes (or opt-out
boxes) configure ambiguous behaviours and does not render
a valid consent. The ICO guidance [30] and the CNIL [5]
observe that “pre-ticked boxes or any equivalents, cannot be
used for non-essential cookies”. Finally, the European Court of
Justice of the EU judgment (the highest court in the EU) from
October 2019 [13] (also known as the Planet49 GmbH case),
establishes definitely that the consent which a website user
must give is not valid if it contains a pre-checked checkbox
which the user must deselect to refuse their consent.
Non-respect of choice: The CMP stores a positive consent
in the browser even though the user explicitly refused consent.
This practice incurs in violation of the lawfulness principle
established in Articles 5(1)(a) and 6(1) of the GDPR: for the
processing to be lawful, it must be based on a legal ground,
namely, the user consent to the use of cookies (legal ground
demanded by Article 5(3) of the ePD). The EDPB [15] further
specified that “if the individual decided against consenting,
any data processing that had already taken place would be
unlawful” due to lacking legal basis for processing.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The goal of our study is to detect violations of the GDPR
and the ePrivacy directive in cookie banners that implement
IAB Europe’s Transparency & Consent Framework (TCF). We
detect all violations defined in Section III on websites that
originate from the European Union because a TCF banner is
more likely to be observed on EU websites. We also test some
other European and international TLDs.
In this section, we describe the website selection and
data collection processes, followed by our methods to detect
TCF banners and intercept the user consent string. We then
explain how we detect GDPR and ePD violations with our
methodology. To detect violations at scale, we have built a
crawler, called Cookinspect, based on a Selenium-instrumented
Chromium, that we use to perform large-scale automatic crawls
and semi-automatic crawls (with certain human actions) to
audit websites and detect violations at scale. We describe two
measurement campaigns done with Cookinspect in Section V.
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A. Websites Selection and Reachability
We used Tranco to build lists [32]. Tranco aggregates
results from different lists over a month in order to overcome
flaws inherent to these lists’ creation: instability, presence of
unreachable domains, possible attacks to insert domains, etc5.
From the top 1 million list of Tranco of September 20th 2019,
we extracted the top 1 000 websites of the TLD of 31 European
country and 1 000 websites from three country-independant
TLDs: .com, .org and .eu. Altogether, we obtained 28 257
websites (some countries had few websites in Tranco). The
second column of Table II shows the number of crawled
websites for each TLD.
Since our study is focused on the respect of consent,
we decided to respect publishers consent regarding bots
and crawling on their websites by checking the instructions
in each website’s robots.txt file. For each website d
in a list of 28 257 websites, we first visited the address
https://www.d/robots.txt using Python’s urllib to
verify access authorization. If access was denied, we did not
crawl the website. As a result, 3 633 (12.86%) websites out
of 28 257 refused access to robots in their robots.txt file,
so we have removed them from our further analysis.
While testing authorization, we also verified reachability.
If loading the robots.txt file failed for a network-related
reason, we attempted accessing it through HTTP. If DNS
resolution failed for www.d, we attempted accessing d instead.
We determined if the website was loaded with a timeout of 10
seconds. If loading timed out 3 times, we considered access
not successful. We applied the same criteria when visiting the
main page with a Selenium-controlled browser. In total, 1 675
(5.9%) websites were not reachable.
As a result, we have successfully automatically crawled 22
949 websites originating from up to 1 000 websites from each
TLD. The resulting 22 949 websites constitute the basis for
the investigations that we describe in Section V.
B. Detecting a TCF Cookie Banner
We first automatically detect websites with cookie banners
that implement TCF. Cookinspect detects the presence of a
TCF banner by checking whether a __cmp() function is de-
fined on a given website (each Consent Management Provider
(CMP) must implement a __cmp() function according to the
TCF specification [24], see more details in Section II-3).
To validate our detection method in practice, we made a
preliminary crawl on 21 000 websites, and analyzed how often
__cmp() and __cmpLocator are used. We observed that
all websites except for one that implement __cmpLocator
also implement the __cmp() function. We also observed that
20.76% of websites define a __cmp() function but do not
implement __cmpLocator. Therefore we can safely use a
hypothesis that if the __cmp() function is defined, then a
CMP is present on a website. We therefore rely on a presence
of a __cmp() function to conclude that a CMP is present
on a website. When crawling a website, Cookinspect waits
for the website to finish all loading, waits for additional
3 seconds6, and then verifies whether the window object
5See Appendix C for the lists and options we used.
6Experimental tests on 200 websites showed that no more than a 2s delay
is necessary.
contains a __cmp function. If a __cmp() function is not
detected, Cookinspect does not re-load the page.
As a result, we have automatically detected TCF banners on
1 426 websites and we show further results on the prevalence
of TCF banners and CMPs that implement them in Section VI.
C. Intercepting a Consent String
CMPs that implement a TCF banner can use a number of
different methods to share a consent string with advertisers
present on a website (see Section II-3). In this section, we
describe how Cookinspect intercepts the consent strings using
all available methods, summarized in Figure 5. Cookinspect
relies on several browser extensions that help injecting scripts
and collecting the consent string using different methods.
Cookinspect contains a Python script that collects all the
intercepted consent strings and logs them in a local database.
Standard APIs. First, Cookinspect actively pretends to be
an advertiser in a first party position: it inserts its script in
the context of the crawled website (method Ê). The injected
script is first-party because it runs in the origin of the crawled
website (in the origin of site.com in Fig. 5). The injected
script makes a direct call to the __cmp() function, and if it
obtains a consent string in return, then the script transmits it
back to the Python script that logs the consent strings.
Second, Cookinspect pretends to be an advertiser in a
third-party position: Cookinspect contains a custom browser
extension Ë that injects a script in all third-party iframes
that have the __cmpLocator iframe as a parent (only the
children of an iframe with the __cmpLocator identifier
are able to query for the consent string). From each such
iframe, the injected script sends a postMessage __cmpCall
to the __cmpLocator iframe to request for the consent string
(method Ë). The script then transmits it back to the extension
and further to the Python script for logging.
Shared cookie. A browser extension Ì of Cookinspect that
reads attempts to read the shared cookie, and then transmits it
to the extension and back to the Python script.
URL-based methods. To intercept the URL-based meth-
ods and obtain consent strings shared with third parties, a
custom browser extension Í monitors all network requests.
According to the TCF, a consent can be transmitted by the
URL-based methods inside the gdpr_consent parameter –
we therefore log all the requests containing such parameter
(method Í). Although the TCF only mentions GET requests,
we also monitor POST requests parameters. We observed that
POST requests transmit a consent string on 399 websites (out
of 1 426 TCF websites, i.e. 28.0%), while GET requests do
so on 764 websites (53.6%).
Since the consent redirecting mechanism always uses
HTTP requests to transmit the consent string in the
gdpr_consent parameter, we already detect it by intercept-
ing all GET and POST requests that contain such parameter.
Non-standard method. According to TCF specification,
safeFrames act as a proxy to the __cmp() function. Cookin-
spect therefore does not specifically interfere with safeFrames,
because it obtains a consent string by making a direct call to
the __cmp() function, that is already done with method Ê.
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Fig. 5: Detecting stored consent strings with Cookinspect.
D. Identifying the CMP Responsible for a TCF Banner
To identify a CMP behind a banner, we use the consent
string that we obtain from the standard APIs and the shared
cookie. We decode the consent string with a public script
provided by IAB [27]. The decoded array contains the CMP
identifier or ID (see cmpId in an example of decoded consent
string in Fig. 4). We map the CMP ID to the public CMP
list [22] to retrieve the CMP company’s name.
E. Detecting GDPR and ePD Violations
To detect violations based on consent strings, we first
explain what information we extract from the consent strings,
and then explain how we detect violations. Each consent
string contains two arrays: an array of allowed advertisers,
and an array of accepted purposes. As further we discuss
in Section XI, it is unclear how advertisers are supposed to
interpret these two sources of information. Purposes for data
processing have a strong legal meaning (see Section III), we
therefore focus in our study on the purposes stored in a consent
string, and do not analyze the array of allowed advertisers.
By using Cookinspect we detect the four major violations
of GDPR and ePD presented in Section III. We explain below
what methods we have used to detect each violation.
Consent stored before choice: Cookinspect logs all the
consent strings by intercepting standard APIs and a shared
cookie (methods Ê, Ë and Ì in Figure 5). Cookinspect is able
to detect Consent stored before choice violation fully automat-
ically while crawling 22 949 websites without performing any
user action. If the consent string stored in the user’s browser
is empty (have no accepted purposes), then we do not label
it as a violation. We therefore consider a violation only if the
consent string has one or more accepted purposes (out of five
possible purposes in the TCF, see Appendix A) even though
no action was performed on the visited website.
No way to opt out: we detect this violation manually
by visiting the websites and using Cookinspect to assign the
corresponding labels designed for this violation. To identify
whether there is an option to refuse consent, we perform the
following procedure.
1) If there is a refuse button on the banner, we click it
directly. Otherwise, we open the banners parameters.
2) In ”parameters” option, we un-tick any purpose-related
option (checkbox or slider), independently from the kind
of option (including e.g. functional cookies).
3) If there is a refuse-all button, we click it even if options
are unticked by default.
4) When banners propose vendors-related options, we ignore
them, because we only analyse purposes stored in the
consent string.
5) When the banner doesn’t have a “parameters” button, but
only a link to a privacy policy, we follow this link and
attempt to find a way to refuse consent within 10 seconds.
Pre-selected choices: we detect this violation manually
by visiting the websites and using Cookinspect to assign the
corresponding labels designed for this violation. We label a
website as violating if it has a ”parameters” option, and in the
”parameters” page there is at least one pre-selected checkbox
or enabled slider for at least one purpose.
Non-respect of choice: to detect this violation, we per-
form a semi-automatic crawl based on a human operator and
Cookinspect crawler on 560 websites from French, Italian
or English-speaking countries: France, UK, Belgium, Ireland
and Italy, and .com websites. We only considered banners
written in a language that at least one of the authors speak
to make sure we understand the actions we perform. First, a
human operator manually refuses a consent on a cookie banner
(following the procedure above). Then, Cookinspect logs all
the consent strings by using the standard APIs and shared
cookie. Some TCF banners may not allow users to untick some
of the purposes considering that such purposes do not require
consent. Such decision can be criticized by legal experts and
policy makers, however we exclude such discussions from our
work. Instead, we further consider only consent strings that
have all five accepted purposes, to ensure that a violation
indeed took place, even if the user couldn’t refuse some of
the purposes of data processing in the TCF banner.
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Fig. 6: Overview of the website-auditing process combin-
ing automatic crawling, semi-automatic crawling with human
interaction and manual analysis to detect GDPR and ePD
violations.
TABLE I: Overview of methods to detect the GDPR and the
ePD violations in TCF banners.
Short name Type of crawl Analyzed
component
Number of
tested websites
Consent stored before
choice
automatic consent string 1 426
No way to opt out semi-automatic banner 560
Pre-selected choices semi-automatic
(when opting out
is possible)
banner 508
Non-respect of choice semi-automatic
(when opting out
is possible)
consent string 508
V. TWO MEASUREMENT CAMPAIGNS
We perform a large-scale study of websites registered in the
EU because the TCF is likely to be observed more often on
European websites. We perform two measurement campaigns
with Cookinspect: a large-scale automatic crawl and a smaller-
scale semi-automatic crawl, both conducted in September 2019
from France. The source code of Cookinspect and all the
extensions is publicly available so that end users and DPAs
can test compliance of publishers and CMPs by themselves
(see Appendix B).
Figure 6 provides an overview of the main components
of our website auditing process. Table I presents an overview
of violations we detect using automatic and semi-automatic
crawling campaigns with Cookinspect. For each violation,
we show what crawl was used for its detection and which
component of the Web application allowed us to detect it.
A. Automatic Crawl
First, we perform a stateless automatic crawl of 22 949
selected websites (see Section IV-A for websites selection)
to perform website auditing without human intervention to
detect: (1) whether the website contains a TCF banner7, (2)
whether positive consent is stored without any user action
7We do not test for the __cmpLocator iframe presence, as we found
only 1 website among 21 000 on which we could find a __cmpLocator
iframe but no __cmp() function during a test run.
(Consent stored before choice violation), (3) whether the
website accesses the consent in a shared cookie, (4) presence
of third-party tracking requests prior to any user consent.
In a first browser session, we first detect if the website
implements the TCF by verifying whether a __cmp() func-
tion is defined after load and a 3s delay. If so, we attempt
to obtain the consent string using Cookinspect to detect the
Consent stored before choice violation. Cookinspect also logs
all requests made to third-parties. In a new clean browser
session, we place a shared cookie in the browser, and attempt
to get it back using a direct __cmp() call and a postMessage.
This crawl takes an average of 11.04s per website. Crawl-
ing 28 000 websites takes more than 24 hours. This crawl was
made from France on September 20th and 21st 2019.
B. Semi-Automatic Crawl
From the resulting 1 426 websites that contain a TCF
banner, we select 560 websites of French, Italian or English-
speaking countries (the languages that the authors speak flu-
ently) from .uk, .fr, .it, .be, .ie and .com TLDs to
perform a semi-automatic crawl.
This crawl performs tests requiring interaction with the
cookie banner8. Upon different browser sessions, we give both
a positive and a negative consent, to make tests regarding
respect of given consent, and setting of the shared cookie.
We also note whether banners propose an option to refuse
consent, and whether specific parameters are pre-selected in
favor of consent-sharing.
On a clean browser session, we load the website. If there
is no banner or a broken banner, we stop there. We manually
label when the Pre-selected choices or No way to opt out
violation is observed (see the complete procedure describing
the labelling process in Section IV-E). We then refuse consent
on the banner, and observe with Cookinspect what consent is
stored by the CMP (including the shared cookie) to detect the
Non-respect of choice violation. After 3 seconds, we refresh
the page to log all the network requests (to quantify the amount
of trackers). We also attempt to obtain the consent string again.
Then, on a new session, we repeat this procedure, this time
giving a positive consent to the banner. We give the detailed
procedure that the human operator to refuse and accept consent
on the banner in Appendix D.
Each website takes around 30-40s given a reactive human
manipulation. We performed this stateless crawl from France
from September 23rd to October 1st 2019.
C. Verification Procedure
For the Non-respect of choice and the No way to opt out
violations, we cross-checked choices made in the banner and
whether the banner allows to refuse consent by two human
operators to limit errors. The three operators are computer
scientists working on web tracking. The semi-automatic crawl
is first entirely done by one of the operators. For each CMP
on which we observe a Non-respect of choice on at least one
8As the TCF does not specify anything regarding the user’s interface, we
don’t have a way to locate a banner and its different elements, and a fortiori
to automate banner interaction.
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Fig. 7: Distribution of the identified CMPs seen at least 5 times
during the semi-automatic crawl.
website, we select one of these violating websites. We add an
equal number of websites on which the violation is not seen in
the pool of sites to be verified. Then, a human operator refuses
consent on all of these websites, unknowingly of which website
was considered a violation by the previous tester. We do the
same for the No way to opt out violation, this time testing
for the possibility to refuse consent. Then, the third human
operator repeats the procedure on a new pool of websites. In
case of a conflict, we keep the results of the test returning the
least violations, and retest all websites of the considered CMP.
D. Ethical Considerations
Our data collection process does not involve any human
subject. Our study of websites is mostly passive: the only
action we perform on websites is, for some of them, to click
on manually-selected cookie acceptance buttons. Hence, we do
not temper with any distant system. Our large-scale measure-
ment does not present any potential harm for websites, while
presenting societal benefits. Moreover, we respect publishers’
consent regarding bots that they express in a robots.txt
file (see website selection process in Section IV).
VI. PREVALENCE OF TCF BANNERS IN EUROPE
We have conducted an automatic crawl of 28 257 websites
from 1 000 top Tranco websites for 31 European TLD and
1 000 websites from .com, .org and .eu domains between
September 20th and September 23rd 2019. Among reachable
and authorized websites, 1 426 (6.2%) had a TCF banner
(cookie banner of a CMP implementing the TCF). We show
per-TLD details in Table II. The 1 426 websites that have a
TCF banner are the target of the following automatic crawls.
We extract information from the consent strings to identify
the CMP present on a website. As not all websites were setting
up a consent string upon our visit (see our methodology in
Section IV), and some consent strings contain an incorrect
CMP ID, we have been able to identify the CMP company
behind a TCF banner for 298 (20.9%) websites in the auto-
matic crawl, and 511 (92.9%) websites in the semi-automatic
crawl. We represent the distribution of identified CMPs in the
semi-automatic crawl in Figure 7. The most encountered CMP
is Quantcast, far beyond OneTrust, Didomi and Sourcepoint.
We have not found any implementation of the version 2 of
TCF that came out in August 20th 2019.
TABLE II: Distribution of websites with a TCF banner across
European (and 3 international) TLDs, computed with an auto-
matic crawl.
TLD Number of domains
in the Tranco top-1
million list
Number of reachable
and allowed domains
Number of domains
with a TCF-related
cookie banner
.uk 1 000 788 (78.8%) 149 (18.9%)
.fr 1 000 815 (81.5%) 139 (17.1%)
.pl 1 000 858 (85.8%) 129 (15.0%)
.it 1 000 824 (82.4%) 123 (14.9%)
.es 1 000 800 (80.0%) 113 (14.1%)
.nl 1 000 838 (83.8%) 65 (7.8%)
.gr 1 000 720 (72.0%) 53 (7.4%)
.pt 1 000 793 (79.3%) 52 (6.6%)
.de 1 000 881 (88.1%) 56 (6.4%)
.ro 1 000 787 (78.7%) 50 (6.4%)
.bg 547 449 (82.1%) 26 (5.8%)
.fi 1 000 824 (82.4%) 47 (5.7%)
.no 1 000 862 (86.2%) 48 (5.6%)
.dk 1 000 824 (82.4%) 41 (5.0%)
.be 1 000 863 (86.3%) 38 (4.4%)
.at 1 000 873 (87.3%) 33 (3.8%)
.ie 1 000 769 (76.9%) 25 (3.3%)
.cz 1 000 916 (91.6%) 28 (3.1%)
.ch 1 000 849 (84.9%) 26 (3.1%)
.se 1 000 787 (78.7%) 21 (2.7%)
.sk 1 000 879 (87.9%) 14 (1.6%)
.hr 627 513 (81.8%) 8 (1.6%)
.hu 1 000 794 (79.4%) 6 (0.8%)
.lu 186 147 (79.0%) 1 (0.7%)
.lt 745 605 (81.2%) 4 (0.7%)
.lv 537 420 (78.2%) 2 (0.5%)
.si 514 426 (82.9%) 2 (0.5%)
.is 358 248 (69.3%) 1 (0.4%)
.ee 468 373 (79.7%) 1 (0.3%)
.li 105 62 (59.0%) 0 (0.0%)
.cy 108 76 (70.4%) 0 (0.0%)
.mt 62 37 (59.7%) 0 (0.0%)
.com 1 000 711 (71.1%) 97 (13.6%)
.org 1 000 735 (73.5%) 16 (2.2%)
.eu 1 000 803 (80.3%) 12 (1.5%)
all 28 257 22 949 (81.2%) 1 426 (6.2%)
VII. QUANTIFICATION OF VIOLATIONS
In this section, we comment on the results regarding
the main violations of the GDPR and the ePD described in
section III. These violations concern consent strings obtained
using the standard API and shared cookie (see section IV-C).
Violations related to consent strings seen in GET and POST
requests are shown in section VIII-A, because we cannot
attribute their responsibility to the CMP or the publisher.
A. Detected GDPR and ePD Violations
1) Overview of Violations: We show a summary of the
main violations’ prevalence, depending on the number of
purposes in the consent strings, in Table III. As a reminder, we
consider violations of Consent stored before choice when we
find a consent string with 1 to 5 purposes set, but only when
5 purposes are set for Non-respect of choice.
TABLE III: Number of websites seen with the different viola-
tions, w.r.t maximum number of purposes in observed consent
strings. Considered violating cases are shown in bold.
Number of
purposes
Consent stored
before choice
No way to opt
out
Pre-selected
choices
Non-respect of
choice
1 to 4 purposes 3.7% (53/1426) - - 6.7% (34/508)
5 purposes 8.6% (122/1426) - - 7.7% (39/508)
Total number
of violations
12.3% (175/1426) 6.8% (38/560) 46.5% (236/508) 7.7% (39/508)
Any violation 54.46% 305/560
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TABLE IV: Quantification of violations of the GDPR encountered in the different CMPs for which the considered violations
has been seen at least 3 times during the semi-automatic crawl (on .fr, .uk, .it, .be, .ie and .com websites), by CMP.
The Non-respect of choice and Pre-selected choices tables only consider websites on which refusing consent was possible.
(a) Consent stored
before choice
CMP total .uk .fr .it .be .ie .com
OneTrust 74.0% (37/50) 81.2% (13/16) 66.7% (4/6) 25.0% (1/4) 100.0% (9/9) 100.0% (3/3) 58.3% (7/12)
Quantcast 3.4% (6/174) 0.0% (0/60) 0.0% (0/34) 12.8% (5/39) 20.0% (1/5) 0.0% (0/12) 0.0% (0/24)
Axel Springer 60.0% (6/10) - 0.0% (0/1) 83.3% (5/6) - - 33.3% (1/3)
Commanders Act 40.0% (4/10) - 40.0% (4/10) - - - -
Livesport Media 100.0% (3/3) - 100.0% (1/1) 100.0% (1/1) - - 100.0% (1/1)
Global Radio Services 100.0% (3/3) 100.0% (3/3) - - - - -
others 2.3% (7/310) 1.4% (1/70) 1.1% (1/87) 0.0% (0/73) 15.4% (2/13) 10.0% (1/10) 3.5% (2/57)
all 11.8% (66/560) 11.4% (17/149) 7.2% (10/139) 9.8% (12/123) 44.4% (12/27) 16.0% (4/25) 11.3% (11/97)
(b) No way to opt
out
CMP total .uk .fr .it .be .ie .com
Quantcast 5.2% (9/174) 0.0% (0/60) 0.0% (0/34) 23.1% (9/39) 0.0% (0/5) 0.0% (0/12) 0.0% (0/24)
Axel Springer 70.0% (7/10) - 100.0% (1/1) 83.3% (5/6) - - 33.3% (1/3)
Evidon 22.7% (5/22) 10.0% (1/10) 100.0% (1/1) - 100.0% (1/1) 50.0% (1/2) 12.5% (1/8)
Global Radio Services 100.0% (3/3) 100.0% (3/3) - - - - -
others 4.0% (14/351) 2.6% (2/76) 2.9% (3/103) 2.6% (2/78) 9.5% (2/21) 9.1% (1/11) 6.5% (4/62)
all 6.8% (38/560) 4.0% (6/149) 3.6% (5/139) 13.0% (16/123) 11.1% (3/27) 8.0% (2/25) 6.2% (6/97)
(c) Pre-selected
choices
CMP total .uk .fr .it .be .ie .com
Quantcast 37.8% (62/164) 55.0% (33/60) 32.4% (11/34) 20.0% (6/30) 60.0% (3/5) 33.3% (4/12) 21.7% (5/23)
OneTrust 83.3% (40/48) 93.3% (14/15) 83.3% (5/6) 100.0% (4/4) 77.8% (7/9) 66.7% (2/3) 72.7% (8/11)
Sourcepoint 64.7% (22/34) 100.0% (21/21) 0.0% (0/8) - - - 20.0% (1/5)
Didomi 39.0% (16/41) 100.0% (1/1) 24.1% (7/29) 0.0% (0/1) 100.0% (6/6) - 50.0% (2/4)
OneTag 100.0% (9/9) - - 100.0% (9/9) - - -
Commanders Act 80.0% (8/10) - 80.0% (8/10) - - - -
Conversant Europe 100.0% (7/7) 100.0% (1/1) - 100.0% (3/3) - - 100.0% (3/3)
Ensighten 100.0% (7/7) 100.0% (7/7) - - - - -
SFR 100.0% (4/4) - 100.0% (4/4) - - - -
Evidon 25.0% (4/16) 11.1% (1/9) - - - - 42.9% (3/7)
Wikia. (FANDOM) 100.0% (3/3) - - - - - 100.0% (3/3)
Cookie Trust WG. 60.0% (3/5) - 100.0% (2/2) 50.0% (1/2) 0.0% (0/1) - -
Axel Springer 100.0% (3/3) - - 100.0% (1/1) - - 100.0% (2/2)
Snigel Web Services 75.0% (3/4) - 100.0% (1/1) - - 0.0% (0/1) 100.0% (2/2)
Spil Games 100.0% (3/3) 100.0% (1/1) 100.0% (1/1) 100.0% (1/1) - - -
TrustArc 100.0% (3/3) - - - - - 100.0% (3/3)
Livesport Media 100.0% (3/3) - 100.0% (1/1) 100.0% (1/1) - - 100.0% (1/1)
others 23.6% (33/140) 25.0% (7/28) 40.0% (14/35) 7.4% (4/54) 100.0% (1/1) 33.3% (1/3) 31.6% (6/19)
all 46.5% (236/508) 60.1% (86/143) 42.1% (56/133) 28.3% (30/106) 77.3% (17/22) 36.8% (7/19) 47.1% (40/85)
(d) Non-respect of
choice
CMP total .uk .fr .it .be .ie .com
Conversant Europe 100.0% (7/7) 100.0% (1/1) - 100.0% (3/3) - - 100.0% (3/3)
Evidon 25.0% (4/16) 22.2% (2/9) - - - - 28.6% (2/7)
OneTrust 8.3% (4/48) 6.7% (1/15) 0.0% (0/6) 0.0% (0/4) 11.1% (1/9) 0.0% (0/3) 18.2% (2/11)
Snigel Web Services 100.0% (4/4) - 100.0% (1/1) - - 100.0% (1/1) 100.0% (2/2)
M6 Web 75.0% (3/4) - 75.0% (3/4) - - - -
WEBEDIA 100.0% (3/3) - 100.0% (3/3) - - - -
Livesport Media 100.0% (3/3) - 100.0% (1/1) 100.0% (1/1) - - 100.0% (1/1)
others 2.6% (11/423) 0.0% (0/118) 2.5% (3/118) 4.1% (4/98) 0.0% (0/13) 0.0% (0/15) 6.6% (4/61)
all 7.7% (39/508) 2.8% (4/143) 8.3% (11/133) 7.5% (8/106) 4.5% (1/22) 5.3% (1/19) 16.5% (14/85)
We find examples of websites for all considered violations.
We find that 38 (6.8%) websites do no provide any way to
refuse consent. 236 (46.5%) websites pre-tick the purpose or
vendor options. 175 websites (12.3%) set a consent string with
1 to 5 purposes before any user action. 39 websites (7.68%)
set a consent string with 5 purposes even though the user gave
a negative consent.
2) Quantification per Violation: Table IV shows the results
of each violation, grouped by CMP seen performing a violation
at least 3 times in the semi-automatic crawl. To compute
the results of the Pre-selected choices and Non-respect of
choice violations, we only consider websites having a banner
proposing a way to refuse consent (508 websites), i.e. we
exclude banners having the No way to opt out violations (38
websites), and broken/missing banners (14 websites).
Consent stored before choice: Table V shows results of the
automatic crawl per TLD. We observe 175 websites registering
a consent string that contains a positive consent even though
the user did not perform any action. 122 of them contain all of
the TCF’s purposes. This is a striking abuse of the framework,
TABLE V: Results of the Consent stored before choice viola-
tion on 1 426 websites via an automatic crawl.
TLD Number of websites
.uk 11.4% (17/149)
.fr 7.2% (10/139)
.pl 42.6% (55/129)
.it 9.8% (12/123)
.es 7.1% (8/113)
.nl 0.0% (0/65)
.gr 3.8% (2/53)
.pt 1.9% (1/52)
.de 28.6% (16/56)
.ro 2.0% (1/50)
.bg 3.8% (1/26)
.fi 10.6% (5/47)
.no 2.1% (1/48)
.dk 4.9% (2/41)
.be 42.1% (16/38)
.at 12.1% (4/33)
.ie 16.0% (4/25)
TLD Number of websites
.cz 3.6% (1/28)
.ch 0.0% (0/26)
.se 9.5% (2/21)
.sk 7.1% (1/14)
.hr 0.0% (0/8)
.hu 0.0% (0/6)
.lu 0.0% (0/1)
.lt 25.0% (1/4)
.lv 0.0% (0/2)
.si 0.0% (0/2)
.is 0.0% (0/1)
.ee 0.0% (0/1)
.com 11.3% (11/97)
.org 12.5% (2/16)
.eu 16.7% (2/12)
all 12.3% (175/1426)
happening on more than 1 in 10 websites using it. Interestingly,
according to the TCF specification, the APIs we have used
to detect consent string should not return the consent string
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TABLE VI: Top 20 websites where we observe each violation, ordered by their rank in the Tranco list. See complete lists of
website for each violation in attachment [1].
Consent stored before choice
Tranco rank domain
48 msn.com
373 softonic.com
434 merriam-webster.com
453 britannica.com
545 slate.com
551 thesun.co.uk
705 onet.pl
706 medicalnewstoday.com
821 thetimes.co.uk
841 techtarget.com
No way to opt out
Tranco rank domain
48 msn.com
322 healthline.com
345 economist.com
545 slate.com
706 medicalnewstoday.com
849 discogs.com
8 017 ilmessaggero.it
8 842 ticketmaster.co.uk
10 972 tomshw.it
12 623 ilgazzettino.it
Pre-selected choices
Tranco rank domain
58 cnn.com
113 reuters.com
119 tinyurl.com
127 bloomberg.com
133 fandom.com
197 w3schools.com
316 mashable.com
373 softonic.com
425 wikia.com
434 merriam-webster.com
Non-respect of choice
Tranco rank domain
113 reuters.com
151 telegraph.co.uk
197 w3schools.com
277 sindonews.com
373 softonic.com
486 inc.com
493 fastcompany.com
562 wowhead.com
841 techtarget.com
1 085 makeuseof.com
before the user gives their decision on consent (or consent is
retrieved from existing cookies) [24].
No way to opt out: We observe 38 websites offering no
option to give a negative consent. These website take part in a
framework about user’s consent collection, but do not actually
offer a way to give a negative consent. Collected consent
cannot be considered free, as required by the GDPR.
Pre-selected choices: Almost half of tested websites (236
out of 508) pre-select choices. In the Planet49 case [13]
announced few days after we finished the crawling campaigns,
the European court of Justice decided that such pre-selected
choices leads to an invalid consent.
Non-respect of choice: 39 websites register a positive con-
sent even though the user gave a negative one. This strikingly
violates user’s choice, the framework, and the GDPR.
We observe a variety of violations among the different
CMPs. Interestingly, violations are often seen on a partial
number of websites. This shows that CMPs offer several
versions of their banners that behave differently. We further
discuss the shared responsibility of violations between CMPs
and publishers in section XI.
We give additional presentations of the results (per-country
and per-CMPs views) in Appendix E.
3) Quantification per Publisher: We observe violations on
a wide range of websites. For each violation, we display the
lists of top 10 violating websites, ordered by their rank in the
Tranco list in Table VI. msn.com, ranked 48 in the Tranco list,
stores a positive consent before any user choice, then offers
no way to opt out. medicalnewstoday.com, a website
about health, does the same, even though medical information
is a sensitive category of data. w3schools.com, a popular
website providing web development tutorials, displays a banner
with pre-selected choices, but registers a positive consent
even if the user gets into the trouble of deselecting them.
softonic.com, website of a major software developer,
registers a positive consent before user action, then displays a
banner with pre-selected choices, and finally does not respect
the user’s decision.
B. Escalation of Violations with a Shared Consent
Setting a violating consent string in a cookie shared among
all TCF websites would constitute an escalation of the prob-
lem. We investigate the question: to what extent do websites
use the shared cookie? As explained in section IV-C, we
try to read it using a browser extension after giving both a
positive and a negative consent in the semi-automatic crawl.
We observe 126 (22.9%) websites setting the shared cookie.
We then estimate how many websites access and reuse
the shared cookie. We place a custom cookie (respecting the
specification) in the browser, query the CMP using the standard
APIs, and see if the CMP returns the exact same consent
string (with no banner interaction). Using this protocol, 62
(4.3%) websites return the same consent strings. This means
that CMPs on these websites reuse the shared cookie, even if
it has been created by another CMP. This constitutes a lower
bound, because CMPs can return another consent string than
the one stored in the cookie.
We also estimate how many websites access the shared
cookie by studying how many of them use the HTTP
redirect mechanism described in section II-3 to do so.
We first observe that many consent redirecting domains
do not respect the specification. Indeed, during manual in-
quiry, we find redirecting schemes using different values
for the GET parameter specifying the redirection URL.
For example, on mirror.co.uk we observed a GET re-
quest with gdpr_consent_string parameter instead of
gdpr_consent. As we cannot cover these cases exhaus-
tively, we focus on those respecting the specification. The
only one we observe doing so (sddan.consensu.org,
owned by the SIRDATA CMP) is used on 53 (9.5%) websites
during the semi-automatic crawl. This hints that the practice
of reading the shared consent cookie is quite common.
We observe 3 websites setting the shared cookie in the
Consent stored before choice case, 3 in the Non-respect of
choice case with 5 purposes, and 20 (3.9%) with 1 to 5
purposes. Visiting one of the 3 websites on which the cookie
is set before any user action on the banner will automatically
set a global positive consent cookie. Visiting one of the 20
websites that do not respect user decision will set a global
positive consent cookie against the user’s decision. This is
particularly troubling in terms of privacy: since this consent is
reused among different publishers, it constitutes an escalation
of the problem. We discuss this further in Section XI.
VIII. MEASURING THIRD PARTY REQUESTS: PRESENCE
OF CONSENT AND THIRD-PARTY TRACKERS
In previous sections, we studied violations in consent
strings obtained via the standard API and shared cookies, as
described in Section II-3. Responsibility of such violations can
be attributed to CMPs and publishers (see the discussion in
Section XI). However, when we find a non-compliant consent
string via a URL-based method, we have no way to know
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whether that consent string was legitimately transmitted by
the CMP or any other third party present on a page.
In this section, we study third-party requests observed in
the two crawls. We first analyse the consent strings transmitted
via URL-based methods, and then measure how many third
party trackers are present on the page before user actions, after
acceptance and after refusal of consent.
A. Third-Party Requests with Consent Strings
In this section, we detect the four GDPR and ePD vi-
olations (see Section III for description of violations and
Section IV describing how we detect them) by analyzing
consent strings that we observed in GET and POST requests
to third parties. We observed consent strings with positive
consent (1 to 5 allowed purposes) in GET or POST requests
before any user action 151 (10.6%) websites out of 22 949
websites in the automatic crawl – this indicates websites with
Consent stored before choice violation. For the Non-respect
of choice violation, we intercepted consent strings in GET
or POST requests with 5 purposes on 63 websites (12.4%).
To evaluate whether these results are complementary to our
previous findings, we count the number of websites in which
we see a violating consent string in GET and POST requests,
but do not obtain a violating consent string via intercepting
the standard APIs or in the shared cookie (see Section IV-C).
Consent stored before choice: Additionally to 66 websites
where we observed this violation while intercepting consent
string with standard APIs and share cookie, we observed it
also on additional 69 websites, where GET or POST requests
send a consent string with positive consent (1 to 5 purposes)
In means that requests containing violating consent strings are
sent while the CMP has not provided a consent string yet.
Non-respect of choice: Additionally to 39 websites where
we observed this violation while intercepting consent string
with standard APIs and share cookie, we observed it also on 38
websites, where we obtain consent strings with all 5 purposes
in GET and POST requests.
We further investigated whether the identifiers of the re-
sponsible CMPs (CMP ID) for each consent string obtained
via GET and POST request match the CMP IDs obtained
from consent strings with standard APIs and shared cookie.
We found CMP IDs in GET and POST requests different from
the ones found using the standard API on 48 websites. In 37
of them, both CMP IDs found were from valid CMPs, while
in remaining 11 websites CMP IDs were set to either 0, 1 or
4095, which do not exist in the CMP public list [22]. It seems
very suspicious that consent strings not created by the actual
CMP (or even non-existent CMPs!) are sent to third parties.
B. Third-party trackers
We measure the number of third party trackers on websites
with TCF banners depending on user consent: before any user
action, after a negative consent and after a positive consent. To
do so, with Cookinspect we logged every request to third-party
domains. From this, we extract domains which are considered
trackers in the Disconnect list [9].
We first measure the number of third party tracking re-
quests without responding to the cookie banner or doing any
TABLE VII: Average number of third-party tracking requests
per website before user action, after a positive and after a
negative consent.
User action Number of third party
tracking requests
Total number of third
party requests
Before user action 22.54 35.04
After a negative consent 28.78 42.50
After a positive consent 39.59 56.75
TABLE VIII: Top 20 tracking companies observed on 508
websites after a negative consent and a page reload.
Tracking company Number of websites TCF Vendor?
Google 491 (96.7%)
AppNexus 356 (70.1%) 3
Facebook 337 (66.3%)
RubiconProject 299 (58.9%) 3
comScore 280 (55.1%) 3
Integral Ad Science 258 (50.8%) 3
Amazon.com 239 (47.0%)
Casale Media 237 (46.7%) 3
Criteo 232 (45.7%) 3
Adform 230 (45.3%) 3
Yahoo! 221 (43.5%) 3
The Trade Desk 217 (42.7%) 3
OpenX 217 (42.7%) 3
Quantcast 202 (39.8%) 3
MediaMath 199 (39.2%) 3
Adobe 193 (38.0%) 3
DataXu 192 (37.8%) 3
PubMatic 186 (36.6%) 3
Horyzon Media 179 (35.2%) 3
SiteScout 165 (32.5%) 3
other action on the website. Then we count third party tracking
requests after giving both a positive and a negative consent to
the cookie banner (for websites on which it is possible), and
reloading the page. Each measurement of trackers is done in a
single browser session, on a single page load. These tests are
done on the 508 websites on which giving a negative consent
is possible in the semi-automatic crawl.
Table VII summarizes the results. We observe that giving
consent on TCF banners, whether it’s positive or negative,
has an effect on the number of included third party trackers.
Surprisingly, even refusing consent increases the number of
tracking requests. The number of websites having the Non-
respect of choice violation (and hence setting a positive consent
even if the user refused) is not sufficient to explain this
increase. We estimate that some scripts, in order to execute
and include content, wait for the __cmp() function to be
defined, which should only happen after the user has given
their choice to the banner [24].
Table VIII shows the top 10 companies that own tracking
domains present on websites after a negative consent (and a
page reload). We matched tracking domains to company names
using the Disconnect list [9]. We find whether they are part
of the TCF by checking if any company name linked to a
tracker domain in WebXRay’s database [35] is present in the
Global Vendor List (version 168). Some top trackers belong
to vendors which are not part of the IAB framework (Google,
Facebook or Amazon), but the rest of them are (eg. AppNexus,
The Rubicon Project, comScore, etc.).
During our study, we encountered many unusual cases,
detailed in appendix F.
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Fig. 8: Interface of our browser extension, Cookie glasses,
displaying the consent transmitted by CMPs to advertisers.
IX. BROWSER EXTENSION
We publish a browser extension called Cookie glasses [1],
to enable users to see if consent stored by CMPs corresponds to
their choice. Users can read information stored in the consent
string provided by the CMP in a simple interface. The most
important pieces of information present in the consent string
are decoded and displayed in a readable format (see Figure 8).
Technically, the extension uses postMessages from the
standards API (see Ë in Figure 5). It is not possible to use
direct calls to the __cmp() function because of browser
security mechanisms. Our tests show that 79% of TCF websites
use the postMessage API. Our extension therefore works on a
majority of websites.
X. LIMITATIONS
Our work has some limitations. First, our scope is limited
to banners of IAB Europe’s TCF. Since we do not detect
other cookie banners, we only observe a subset of all cookie
banners. Besides, our results on the prevalence of TCF banners
represent a lower bound on the actual usage of TCF banners,
due to a variety of implementations of the TCF. For instance,
some banners do not define the __cmp() function on the
first page load. In one of its banners (e.g. on aol.com), the
Oath CMP redirects the user to another website (of a different
domain) to display a consent wall. On this page, the __cmp()
function is not displayed. We do not detect such cases in
our study. While we detect TCF banners on 17.1% of .fr
websites, van Eijk et al. [10] found that 40.2% of European
websites have a cookie banner.
Secondly, results of our semi-automatic crawl are prone
to errors due to dark patterns. Most banners we encountered
nudge users towards accepting consent: some of them make
it particularly difficult to opt out9. As a consequence, results
of our semi-automatic crawls are prone to errors due to these
dark patterns. To limit such errors, we cross-checked answers
to banners by three human operators (see Section V-C).
Nonetheless, it is still possible that some banners are designed
in such a confusing way that the three persons failed to find
the proper way to opt out. We argue that banners that give a
9For instance, an uncolored link is hidden in the middle of a 28 000-word-
long privacy policy on liberation.fr, accessed on October 25th 2019).
technical mean to refuse consent, but make it so difficult that
three computer science researchers do not find it, are still in
violation with the GDPR.
Finally, we only detect violation in client-side consent
strings. Yet, exchanges of consent strings can also happen
outside of the browser. IAB provides extensions fields [28]
for exchanging consent string in its OpenRTB protocol [19].
This protocol is used between ad exchanges and advertisers for
Real-Time Bidding. As such communication happens server-
to-server, we cannot observe it with a client-side approach.
XI. DISCUSSION ON LEGAL COMPLIANCE
In this section, we reflect on our experiments and our
results and comment on open problems that can be addressed
by legal professionals or DPAs.
1) Who is responsible for violations in cookie banners?:
It is a complex task to attribute the responsibility of a non-
compliant cookie banner on a website to either the CMP or
the publisher. CMPs often propose different versions of their
banners that have different legal implications, and provide
a documentation on customizing the banner. For instance,
OneTrust, on its webpage presenting its CMP solution [39],
proposes publishers to “maximize user opt-in with customiz-
able publisher-specific cookie banners [...] to optimize consent
collection”. We argue that CMPs providing non-compliant
cookie banners cannot exonerate themselves and delegate
responsibility to the publishers that include them, especially
when they claim to provide GDPR- and ePrivacy-compliant
consent collection solutions. Conversely, publishers have a part
of responsibility if they choose non-compliant banners. Hence,
the responsibility of non-compliant cookie banners is shared
between CMPs and publishers. CMPs and publishers might
even be considered co-controllers, but we leave this discussion
to lawyers.
Moreover, it is possible that publishers customize the ban-
ner when they host the CMP script in their website, modifying
the original behaviour offered by the CMP. In such a case, the
responsibility of a violating banner should be attributed to the
publisher. Such cases can be detected with extensive case-by-
case manual inspection.
2) Problem of shared consent across publishers: The TCF
defines a “global” cookie that is writable and readable by
all CMPs (see section II-2). We found such example on
letudiant.fr: it obtains the consent string set on the web-
site senscritique.com previously visited by the user10.
This behaviour may not be a violation of the GDPR in itself:
consent must be specific to a given purpose, not to a publisher.
However, it seems suspicious that, even while obtaining the
consent string invisibly for the end user, altervista.org
still displays the cookie banner to the user. This may be
considered as an excessive request (publishers request for a
consent they already have) and a lack of transparency or a
deception (user is tricked into thinking altervista.org
does not have their consent). In fact, in a report about dark
patterns, the CNIL already uses the terms “bordering on
harassment” to describe the repetitive request for consent on
10We show a video of this in attachment [1].
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every website, even without any shared consent considera-
tion [7]. The global consent has been criticized by the Privacy
International NGO [41], which denounced the lack of users’
knowledge that consent is global to websites, and that opting
out is near impossible. This concept of global consent requires
further analysis by legal experts.
Additionally, such a design in the TCF assumes that all
the CMPs who use the global consent mechanism trust each
other on setting the consent string accordingly to the choices
made by the user. But a TCF-wide problem would arise if one
publisher or CMP set this cookie incorrectly, violating user’s
consent. We found that this was not a hypothetical scenario: we
detected 3 websites that set a positive consent in the shared
cookie before the user makes any choice in the banner and
20 websites doing so after the user explicitly refuses consent
(more details in Section VII-B).
3) Unclear purposes in IAB Europe’s TCF: The TCF
proposes five pre-defined purposes (see Table IX in the Ap-
pendix): we leave for discussion to legal professionals whether
defined purposes are clear and specific. The CNIL has already
pronounced that the TCF defined its purposes in a vague,
imprecise way, in the decision against Vectaury [6].
4) Unclear semantics of consent string format: Each con-
sent string contains a list of purposes and a list of vendors. The
specification does not clearly say how advertisers are supposed
to verify their consent, nor how the CMP should populate these
fields. What happens if one of the two lists is empty? Should
vendors assume they have consent if their identifier is in the
vendors array, or should they also check the purposes? The
TCF doesn’t specify how vendors should interpret the consent
string. Moreover, should the vendors list only be populated
with vendors declaring to use consent for the purposes set
in the purposes list? Such questions could be an interesting
terrain of investigation for DPAs.
5) Consent strings can be created by anyone: As shown
in Section VIII-A, we observe on 37 websites requests to
third parties containing consent strings that we suspect are
being forged by non-CMP scripts running on the page, because
they contain a CMP identifier that doesn’t correspond to the
CMP present on the page. Even though the whole purpose of
the TCF is to provide a way for actors in the advertisement
industry to prove that they received consent from the user,
we state that this proof is weak. The consent string’s format
does not contain any cryptographic proof that it was created
by a given CMP, on a given website, in concordance with the
user’s choice. Consent strings can be forged by anyone, as our
observation shows.
XII. RELATED WORK
The first lines of research on cookie banners published
before the GDPR laid on the legal basis of the ePD and its
implementation in various European countries, and were very
country-specific. As the GDPR changed behaviour regarding
cookies [36], [44], trackers and other third-party content [36]
and cookie banners [10], [8], we indicate whether each work
made measurements before or after its release (May 2018).
To the best of our knowledge, the following works mea-
sured prevalence of cookie banners after GDPR. Sanchez et
al. [44] studied the impact of the GDPR on cookie setting
practices. They find that the GDPR had a global impact,
influencing even US-based websites. Similarly to our semi-
automatic crawl, they manually refused consent on 2 000
cookie banners to extract statistics such as the number of
cookies after consent refusal. Van Eijk et al. [10] studied the
impact on user’s location on cookie banners. Using a crowd-
sourced list, they automatically detected cookie banners on
40.2% of European websites. They found that the provenance
of the user has not so much impact as the expected audience
of a website regarding the prevalence of banners. They also
observed important variations between websites of different
top-level domains. Degeling et al. [8] studied characteristics
of 31 cookie banner libraries, including several provided by
CMPs of the TCF, by installing them locally. They found
that 62.2% of European websites displayed cookie banners in
October 2018. The authors observed a 16% increase in cookie
banners adoption by website pre- and post-GDPR.
Similarly to our No way to opt out violation, some works
measured how many banners offer no way to opt out [8]. In
2015, Leenes and Kosta found this issue on 25% of 100 Dutch
websites [33]. The same year, the Article 29 Working Party
found it on 54% of top 250 websites of 8 EU countries [3].
Vallina et al. found cookie banners offering no option to give
a negative consent on 1.36% of porn websites [50].
Several works measured the influence of cookie banners
on the number of trackers or cookies. Before the GDPR,
Carpineto et al. [4] measured how many websites set cookies
without displaying a banner. Traverso et al. [47] measured the
number of trackers before and after giving a positive consent
on banners on 100 Italians websites. They found an average
of 29.5 trackers prior to giving consent. In 2016, Englehardt
and Narayanan [11] found 18 third parties per websites prior
to any consent. In 2017, Trevisan et al. [48] found that 49%
of websites installed profiling cookies before user consent, and
that 80.5% of websites installing tracking cookies did not wait
for user’s consent to do so. After the GDPR came in force,
Sanchez et al. [44] measured the number of cookies after
giving a negative consent on banners. Instead, in our work, we
measure trackers both before and after giving both a positive
and a negative consent.
On the legal side, some regulators have already been active.
The French DPA (CNIL) sued an advertisement company the
used the TCF, invoking a lack of informed, free, specific and
unambiguous consent [43]. They also noted that pre-selecting
consent checkboxes was not compliant with the Article 32 of
the GDPR. The European Court of Justice’s decision in the
Planet49 [13] case recently settled that pre-selecting options
was not GDPR-compliant. Finally, the UK’s DPA (ICO) [31]
recently published a report on adtech and Real-Time Bidding,
studying both IAB Europe’s TCF and Google’s framework.
Among other considerations, they concluded that the TCF
lacked transparency and observed a systemic lack of compli-
ance to their data protection requirements.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have systematically studied cookie ban-
ners of IAB Europe’s Transparency and Consent Framework
(TCF). By collaborating with a researcher in law, we have
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identified four legal violations of both the GDPR and the ePD
and we have detected them on 1 426 European websites that
use TCF cookie banners. We have detected at least one of
these violations in 54% of websites. Finally, to help users
and Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) further investigate
these violations, we provide a browser extension called Cookie
glasses, that is able to detect some of them.
Beyond violations in the implementations of cookies ban-
ners, we believe that the TCF suffers from several problems
open for discussion and improvement. First, the consent string
format has an unclear semantics, which makes it hard to
interpret and use by the third parties that rely on such consent.
Second, the TCF does not provide guidelines on which actors
who obtain user consent (assuming it was obtained in a com-
pliant way) are supposed to respect it: should the publishers,
CMPs or some other actors ensure that the third parties respect
consent they received? We believe that European regulators
should take a more active stand regarding the implementation
of cookie banners: either with supportive actions, such as
guidance, or repressive actions, such as regulatory decisions
and associated fines.
REFERENCES
[1] “Attachments to the paper (anonymized Dropbox repos-
itory),” https://www.dropbox.com/sh/fw8ubf23z3ai0ei/
AABY4qRO3FKXeGELfiPGFHica.
[2] G. Acar, M. Jua´rez, N. Nikiforakis, C. Dı´az, S. F. Gu¨rses, F. Piessens,
and B. Preneel, “Fpdetective: dusting the web for fingerprinters,”
in Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’13),
2013.
[3] Article 29 Working Party, “Cookie sweep combined analysis -
report,” https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document.cfm?action=
display&doc id=56123, accessed on 2019.11.01, 2015.
[4] C. Carpineto, D. Lo Re, and G. Romano, “Automatic assessment of
website compliance to the European cookie law with CooLCheck,” in
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic
Society, 2016.
[5] CNIL, “Article 2 of the deliberation n2019-093 of july 4, 2019
adopting guidelines relating to the application of article 82 of
the law of january 6, 1978 modified to the operations of read-
ing or writing to a user’s terminal (including cookies and other
tracers) (corrigendum),” https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?
cidTexte=JORFTEXT000038783337, accessed on 30 October, 2019.
[6] CNIL, “Dcision n MED 2018-042 du 30 octobre 2018 mettant en
demeure la socit Vectaury,” https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCnil.
do?oldAction=rechExpCnil&id=CNILTEXT000037594451&
fastReqId=974682228&fastPos=2, accessed on 31 October 2019.
[7] CNIL, “IP report: Shaping choices in the digital world,” https://linc.cnil.
fr/fr/ip-report-shaping-choices-digital-world, accessed on 2019.10.30,
2019.
[8] M. Degeling, C. Utz, C. Lentzsch, H. Hosseini, F. Schaub, and T. Holz,
“We value your privacy... now take some cookies: Measuring the
GDPR’s impact on web privacy,” in Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (NDSS), 2018.
[9] Disconnect, “disconnect-tracking-protection,” https://github.com/
disconnectme/disconnect-tracking-protection, accessed on 2019.07.16.
[10] R. v. Eijk, H. Asghari, P. Winter, and A. Narayanan, “The impact of user
location on cookie notices (inside and outside of the European union),”
in Workshop on Technology and Consumer Protection (ConPro’19),
2019.
[11] S. Englehardt and A. Narayanan, “Online tracking: A 1-million-site
measurement and analysis,” in conference on computer and communi-
cations security (CCS’13), 2016.
[12] “Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 25 November 2009,” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=celex%3A32009L0136, accessed on 2019.10.31.
[13] European Court of Justice, “Judgement of the court of justice of the EU,
Case c-673/17,” http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;?&
docid=218462&doclang=EN&cid=8679428, accessed on 2019.10.31.
[14] European Data Protection Board, “Guidelines on consent under reg-
ulation 2016/679 (WP 259 rev.01), adopted on 10 april 2018,” https:
//ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item id=623051.
[15] ——, “Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent (WP 187), adopted
on 13 july 2011,” https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/
opinion-recommendation/files/2011/wp187 en.pdf.
[16] ——, “Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising, 22 june 2010,
WP 171, p. 10,” https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/
opinionrecommendation/files/2007/wp136 en.pdf.
[17] ——, “Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data (WP
136), adopted on 20.06.2007,” https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/
documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2007/wp136 en.pdf.
[18] ——, “Working document 02/2013 providing guidance on obtain-
ing consent for cookies, adopted on 2 october 2013,” https://www.
pdpjournals.com/docs/88135.pdf.
[19] IAB, “Openrtb (real-time bidding),” https://www.iab.com/guidelines/
real-time-bidding-rtb-project/, accessed on 2019.09.16.
[20] ——, “Safeframe,” https://www.iab.com/guidelines/safeframe/, ac-
cessed on 2019.09.16, 2014.
[21] IAB Europe, “CMP ID 1 is not currently assigned to a Consent
Management Provider (CMP),” http://advertisingconsent.eu/2019/01/
cmp-id-1-is-not-currently-assigned-to-a-consent-management-provider-cmp/,
accessed on 2019.09.02.
[22] ——, “CMP list,” https://advertisingconsent.eu/cmp-list/, downloaded
in 2019.04.
[23] ——, “IAB europe transparency & consent framework policies,”
https://iabeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/IABEurope
TransparencyConsentFramework v1-1 policy FINAL.pdf, accessed
on 2019.11.20.
[24] IAB Europe and IAB Tech Lab, “Consent management
provider javascript API v1.1: Transparency & consent
framework,” https://github.com/InteractiveAdvertisingBureau/
GDPR-Transparency-and-Consent-Framework/blob/master/CMP%
20JS%20API%20v1.1%20Final.md#API-provided, 04 2018.
[25] ——, “Transparency and consent framework,”
https://github.com/InteractiveAdvertisingBureau/
GDPR-Transparency-and-Consent-Framework, accessed on
2019.05.03, 04 2018.
[26] ——, “Global vendor list (gvl),” https:
//github.com/InteractiveAdvertisingBureau/
GDPR-Transparency-and-Consent-Frameworkhttps://vendorlist.
consensu.org/vendorlist.json, accessed June 2019, 06 2019.
[27] IAB Tech Lab, “Transparency and consent framework: Consent string
SDK (javascript),” https://github.com/InteractiveAdvertisingBureau/
Consent-String-SDK-JS.
[28] ——, “OpenRTB advisory - GDPR,” https://iabtechlab.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/02/OpenRTB Advisory GDPR 2018-02.pdf, accessed
on 2019.10.16, 02 2018.
[29] IAB Tech Lab and IAB Europe, “GDPR consent pass-
ing for URL-based services: Transparency and consent
framework,” https://github.com/InteractiveAdvertisingBureau/
GDPR-Transparency-and-Consent-Framework/blob/master/
URL-based%20Consent%20Passing %20Framework%20Guidance.
md, 04 2018.
[30] Information Commissioner’s Office, “ICO guidance on
the rules on use of cookies and similar technologies,”
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/
guidance-on-the-use-of-cookies-and-similar-technologies-1-0.pdf.
[31] ——, “Update report into adtech and real time bidding,”
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2615156/
adtech-real-time-bidding-report-201906.pdf, accessed on 2019.07.10,
2019.
[32] V. Le Pochat, T. Van Goethem, S. Tajalizadehkhoob, M. Korczyn´ski,
and W. Joosen, “Tranco: a research-oriented top sites ranking hardened
against manipulation,” in Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium (NDSS), 2019.
14
[33] R. Leenes and E. Kosta, “Taming the cookie monster with Dutch law -
a tale of regulatory failure,” Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 31,
2015.
[34] A. Lerner, A. K. Simpson, T. Kohno, and F. Roesner, “Internet Jones and
the raiders of the lost trackers: An archaeological study of web tracking
from 1996 to 2016,” in 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 16), 2016.
[35] T. Libert, “Exposing the hidden web: An analysis of third-party http re-
quests on 1 million websites,” International Journal of Communication,
2015.
[36] T. Libert, L. Graves, and R. K. Nielsen, “Changes in third-party content
on european news websites after GDPR,” Reuters Institute for the Study
of Journalism, 2018.
[37] N. Nikiforakis, A. Kapravelos, W. Joosen, C. Kruegel, F. Piessens, and
G. Vigna, “Cookieless monster: Exploring the ecosystem of web-based
device fingerprinting,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(SP’13), 2013.
[38] L. Olejnik, M. Tran, and C. Castelluccia, “Selling off user privacy
at auction,” in Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
(NDSS’14), 2014.
[39] OneTrust, “Consent management publishers advertisers,” https://
www.onetrust.com/solutions/consent-management-platform/, accessed
on 2019.10.15.
[40] P. Papadopoulos, N. Kourtellis, and E. P. Markatos, “Cookie synchro-
nization: Everything you always wanted to know but were afraid to
ask,” in The World Wide Web Conference (WWW’19), 2019.
[41] Privacy International, “Most cookie banners are annoying and
deceptive. this is not consent.” https://privacyinternational.org/explainer/
2975/most-cookie-banners-are-annoying-and-deceptive-not-consent,
accessed on 2019.08.12, 2019.
[42] F. Roesner, T. Kohno, and D. Wetherall, “Detecting and defending
against third-party tracking on the web,” in USENIX Symposium on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI’12), 2012.
[43] J. Ryan, “French regulator shows deep flaws in IABs consent framework
and RTB,” https://brave.com/cnil-consent-rtb/, accessed on 2019.03.28,
2018.
[44] I. Sanchez-Rola, M. Dell’Amico, P. Kotzias, D. Balzarotti, L. Bilge,
P.-A. Vervier, and I. Santos, “Can I opt out yet?: GDPR and the
global illusion of cookie control,” in Asia Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (AsiaCCS’19), 2019.
[45] The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union,
“Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive
on privacy and electronic communications),” 2002.
[46] ——, “Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation),” 2016.
[47] S. Traverso, M. Trevisan, L. Giannantoni, M. Mellia, and H. Met-
walley, “Benchmark and comparison of tracker-blockers: Should you
trust them?” in Network Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference
(TMA’17), 2017.
[48] M. Trevisan, S. Traverso, E. Bassi, and M. Mellia, “4 years of EU
cookie law: Results and lessons learned,” Proceedings on Privacy
Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS’19), 2019.
[49] C. Utz, M. Degeling, S. Fahl, F. Schaub, and T. Holz, “(un)informed
consent: Studying gdpr consent notices in the field,” in Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS’19), 2019.
[50] P. Vallina, A´. Feal, J. Gamba, N. Vallina-Rodriguez, and A. F. Anta,
“Tales from the porn: A comprehensive privacy analysis of the web porn
ecosystem,” in Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference
(ICM’19), 2019.
APPENDIX A
PURPOSES DEFINED IN IAB EUROPE’S TCF
We reproduce purposes defined in IAB Europe’s TCF in
Table IX.
APPENDIX B
ATTACHMENTS
In a public repository [1], we provide files that are relevant
to this work: the source files of the Cookie Glasses browser
extension, the full list of websites for each violation, screen-
shots of each website mentioned in this paper, and videos
showing examples of GDPR violations. We promise to release
Cookinspect after acceptance.
APPENDIX C
DATA FOR REPRODUCIBLE RESEARCH
For the sake of research reproducibility, we indicate all data
relevant to this work in Table X.
For selecting the websites, we use Tranco to build lists [32].
Within Tranco, we select the following options: Alexa and
Majestic lists. We don’t use The Cisco Umbrella list because
it is DNS-based, and may not be representative of web traffic.
Likewise, we exclude the Quantcast list because it is based on
US traffic only. We also select the option to remove domains
flagged as dangerous by Google Safe Browsing
From Tranco’s top 1 million list, we extract the first 1 000
websites of the top-level domain (TLD) of each European
country, and 1 000 websites from country-independant TLDs:
.com, .eu and .org on 2019.09.20.
APPENDIX D
PROCEDURE FOR THE HUMAN OPERATORS
In this section, we give the precise procedure that human
operators had to follow to give a negative and a positive
consent on the banners during the semi-automatic crawl.
First, we attempt to refuse consent. If there is a “refuse”
button on the banner, we click it directly; otherwise, we open
the banner’s “parameters”. There, we untick any purpose-
related option (checkbox or slider), independently from the
kind of option (including e.g. functional cookies). If there is
a “refuse-all” button, we click it even if options are unticked
by default. When banners propose vendors-related options, we
ignore them. When the banner does not possess a “parameters”
button, but only a link to the privacy policy (such as on
liberation.fr), we follow this link and attempt to find
a way to refuse consent within 10 seconds, then come back
to the main page. If options to refuse consent are located
on another page linked by the banner, we come back to
the main page after refusing consent. We always close the
banner after refusing consent, by clicking the button whose
terminology least indicates that we allow tracking11. Once
everything is done, we manually label whether we encountered
different cases: pre-selected options12, banner not appearing,
non-functional banner, banner proposing no way to refuse
consent (considering links inside the banner). In one case
(healthline.com), the banner proposed a way to refuse
11Some banners, such as the one on rtl.fr, have both an “accept” button
and a small cross to close it. The “accept” button is misleading, because it sets
a consent string with all purposes set even if the purpose options are unticked,
while the small cross does not.
12We consider that there is a Pre-selected choices violation according to the
visual representation of options (pre-ticked boxes, sliders set to acceptance).
Ambiguous cases such as lefigaro.fr, where neither “accept” nor “deny”
is set by default are not considered a violation.
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TABLE IX: Purposes defined in IAB Europe’s TCF, accessible at https://register.consensu.org/, accessed on May 3rd, 2019.
Purpose
number
Purpose name Purpose description
1 Information stor-
age and access
The storage of information, or access to information that is already stored, on your device such as advertising identifiers, device identifiers,
cookies, and similar technologies.
2 Personalisation The collection and processing of information about your use of this service to subsequently personalise advertising and/or content for you in
other contexts, such as on other websites or apps, over time. Typically, the content of the site or app is used to make inferences about your
interests, which inform future selection of advertising and/or content.
3 Ad selection, de-
livery, reporting
The collection of information, and combination with previously collected information, to select and deliver advertisements for you, and to
measure the delivery and effectiveness of such advertisements. This includes using previously collected information about your interests to select
ads, processing data about what advertisements were shown, how often they were shown, when and where they were shown, and whether you
took any action related to the advertisement, including for example clicking an ad or making a purchase. This does not include personalisation,
which is the collection and processing of information about your use of this service to subsequently personalise advertising and/or content for
you in other contexts, such as websites or apps, over time.
4 Content
selection,
delivery,
reporting
The collection of information, and combination with previously collected information, to select and deliver content for you, and to measure the
delivery and effectiveness of such content. This includes using previously collected information about your interests to select content, processing
data about what content was shown, how often or how long it was shown, when and where it was shown, and whether the you took any action
related to the content, including for example clicking on content. This does not include personalisation, which is the collection and processing
of information about your use of this service to subsequently personalise content and/or advertising for you in other contexts, such as websites
or apps, over time.
5 Measurement The collection of information about your use of the content, and combination with previously collected information, used to measure, understand,
and report on your usage of the service. This does not include personalisation, the collection of information about your use of this service to
subsequently personalise content and/or advertising for you in other contexts, i.e. on other service, such as websites or apps, over time.
TABLE X: Data for reproducible research
Software - Selenium python-selenium 3.141.0-1
Software - Chromium chromium 76.0.3809.100-1
Operating system Arch Linux
Kernel (result of uname -a) Linux 5.2.5-arch1-1-ARCH #1 SMP PREEMPT Wed Jul 31 08:30:34 UTC 2019 x86 64 GNU/Linux
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/73.0.3683.103 Safari/537.36
Location France
Tranco list https://tranco-list.eu/list/4NKX/1000000, generated on 2019.09.20
Disconnect list commit ba312781 (2019-07-29)
WebXRay commit 04c3c8e8 (2019-06-18)
Crawling date (automatic crawl) 2019-09-20 - 2019-09-21
Crawling date (semi-automatic crawl) 2019-09-23 - 10-01
consent, but access to the website is then refused. We mark
such a case as No way to opt out.
Secondly, on a second browser session (or directly if there
is no option to refuse consent on the banner), we accept
tracking by clicking on the “accept” button, or close the banner
when it is the only option (we close the banner in all cases).
If the banner does not appear on first load, we reload the
website until the banner appears, up to 3 times.
APPENDIX E
ALTERNATIVE PRESENTATIONS OF THE RESULTS
We display results of violations observed in the semi-
automatic crawl organized by country in Table XI, and or-
ganized by CMP in Table XII (for CMPs seen at least 5
times). This is interesting for DPAs, who can then see which
CMPs to investigate in priority. We do not display results
for the automatic crawl because we can only identify CMPs
providing consent strings before consent in this case (which
would introduce a bias, and only concern 21.0% of websites).
APPENDIX F
UNUSUAL CASES
We list unusual cases encountered during our whole study.
Multiple banners at once We observed websites dis-
playing two cookie banners, e.g. psicologiaymente.com or
matchendirect.fr. On these two sites, each banner seems to
follow different regulation (pre- or post-GDPR). Our guess is
that publishers forgot to remove the oldest ones.
Multiple banners on different loads We encountered
one specific website (kayak.fr) displaying 4 different banners
under different clean browser sessions. These banners pro-
vide different characteristics (consent wall or not, existence
of a refuse button, access to more specific configurations).
Similarly, public.fr displays 2 different banners when loaded
several times with a clean browser: one allowing parameters
configuration, and one only providing an accept button.
Specifications not followed CMPs on some websites do
not respect the TCF’s specifications at all. On dominos.fr, the
__cmp() function is defined, but only ever returns an empty
JSON object. express.co.uk sets 24 purposes in the consent
string, even though only 5 of them are defined in the TCF and
mentioned on the banner’s text.
Banner not displayed on front page On some websites,
such as gamepedia.com, the banner is not displayed on the
front page.
Redirections upon refusal On some websites, such as
tvguide.co.uk, users are redirected to the privacy policy
page when (and only if) refusing consent. Even more question-
ably, mon-programme-tv.be redirects users automatically
to Wikipedia if they refuse consent. On toro.it, users are
redirected on the privacy policy page of another domain, itself
containing a new cookie banner.
consensu.org’s page While the consensu.org do-
main is used for global consent cookie sharing across publish-
ers and for consent redirection through its subdomains, its main
web pages https://consensu.org and https://www.consensu.org
display a generic park page.
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TABLE XI: Per-country violation tables. Quantification of violations of the GDPR encountered in the different CMPs seen at
least 5 times in that country during the semi-automatic crawl (on .fr, .uk, .it, .be, .ie and .com websites), by CMP.
The Non-respect of choice and Pre-selected choices tables only consider websites on which refusing consent was possible.
(a) .uk
Violations
CMP Number
of
websites
No way to opt
out
Pre-selected
choices
Consent stored
before choice
Non-respect of
choice
Quantcast 60 0.00% (0/60) 55.00% (33/60) 0.00% (0/60) 0.00% (0/60)
Sourcepoint 21 0.00% (0/21) 100.00% (21/21) 0.00% (0/21) 0.00% (0/21)
OneTrust 16 6.25% (1/16) 93.33% (14/15) 81.25% (13/16) 6.67% (1/15)
Evidon 10 10.00% (1/10) 11.11% (1/9) 0.00% (0/10) 22.22% (2/9)
Ensighten 7 0.00% (0/7) 100.00% (7/7) 0.00% (0/7) 0.00% (0/7)
Oath 5 0.00% (0/5) 0.00% (0/5) 0.00% (0/5) 0.00% (0/5)
others 18 16.67% (3/18) 33.33% (5/15) 22.22% (4/18) 6.67% (1/15)
No consent string found 12 8.33% (1/12) 45.45% (5/11) 0.00% (0/12) 0.00% (0/11)
all 149 4.03% (6/149) 60.14% (86/143) 11.41% (17/149) 2.80% (4/143)
(b) .fr
Violations
CMP Number
of
websites
No way to opt
out
Pre-selected
choices
Consent stored
before choice
Non-respect of
choice
Quantcast 34 0.00% (0/34) 32.35% (11/34) 0.00% (0/34) 0.00% (0/34)
Didomi 29 0.00% (0/29) 24.14% (7/29) 0.00% (0/29) 0.00% (0/29)
Commanders Act 10 0.00% (0/10) 80.00% (8/10) 40.00% (4/10) 0.00% (0/10)
Sourcepoint 8 0.00% (0/8) 0.00% (0/8) 0.00% (0/8) 0.00% (0/8)
OneTrust 6 0.00% (0/6) 83.33% (5/6) 66.67% (4/6) 0.00% (0/6)
SIRDATA 5 0.00% (0/5) 0.00% (0/5) 0.00% (0/5) 0.00% (0/5)
Chandago 5 0.00% (0/5) 0.00% (0/5) 0.00% (0/5) 0.00% (0/5)
others 39 12.82% (5/39) 70.59% (24/34) 5.13% (2/39) 32.35% (11/34)
No consent string found 3 0.00% (0/3) 50.00% (1/2) 0.00% (0/3) 0.00% (0/2)
all 139 3.60% (5/139) 42.11% (56/133) 7.19% (10/139) 8.27% (11/133)
(c) .it
Violations
CMP Number
of
websites
No way to opt
out
Pre-selected
choices
Consent stored
before choice
Non-respect of
choice
Quantcast 39 23.08% (9/39) 20.00% (6/30) 12.82% (5/39) 3.33% (1/30)
iubenda 20 0.00% (0/20) 0.00% (0/20) 0.00% (0/20) 0.00% (0/20)
Clickio 14 0.00% (0/14) 0.00% (0/14) 0.00% (0/14) 0.00% (0/14)
Triboo Media 10 0.00% (0/10) 0.00% (0/10) 0.00% (0/10) 0.00% (0/10)
OneTag 9 0.00% (0/9) 100.00% (9/9) 0.00% (0/9) 0.00% (0/9)
Axel Springer 6 83.33% (5/6) 100.00% (1/1) 83.33% (5/6) 0.00% (0/1)
others 22 4.55% (1/22) 66.67% (14/21) 9.09% (2/22) 33.33% (7/21)
No consent string found 3 33.33% (1/3) 0.00% (0/1) 0.00% (0/3) 0.00% (0/1)
all 123 13.01% (16/123) 28.30% (30/106) 9.76% (12/123) 7.55% (8/106)
(d) .be
Violations
CMP Number
of
websites
No way to opt
out
Pre-selected
choices
Consent stored
before choice
Non-respect of
choice
OneTrust 9 0.00% (0/9) 77.78% (7/9) 100.00% (9/9) 11.11% (1/9)
Didomi 6 0.00% (0/6) 100.00% (6/6) 0.00% (0/6) 0.00% (0/6)
Quantcast 5 0.00% (0/5) 60.00% (3/5) 20.00% (1/5) 0.00% (0/5)
others 3 33.33% (1/3) 0.00% (0/1) 66.67% (2/3) 0.00% (0/1)
No consent string found 4 50.00% (2/4) 100.00% (1/1) 0.00% (0/4) 0.00% (0/1)
all 27 11.11% (3/27) 77.27% (17/22) 44.44% (12/27) 4.55% (1/22)
(e) .ie
Violations
CMP Number
of
websites
No way to opt
out
Pre-selected
choices
Consent stored
before choice
Non-respect of
choice
Quantcast 12 0.00% (0/12) 33.33% (4/12) 0.00% (0/12) 0.00% (0/12)
others 7 14.29% (1/7) 40.00% (2/5) 57.14% (4/7) 20.00% (1/5)
No consent string found 6 16.67% (1/6) 50.00% (1/2) 0.00% (0/6) 0.00% (0/2)
all 25 8.00% (2/25) 36.84% (7/19) 16.00% (4/25) 5.26% (1/19)
(f) .com
Violations
CMP Number
of
websites
No way to opt
out
Pre-selected
choices
Consent stored
before choice
Non-respect of
choice
Quantcast 24 0.00% (0/24) 21.74% (5/23) 0.00% (0/24) 0.00% (0/23)
OneTrust 12 8.33% (1/12) 72.73% (8/11) 58.33% (7/12) 18.18% (2/11)
Evidon 8 12.50% (1/8) 42.86% (3/7) 0.00% (0/8) 28.57% (2/7)
Sourcepoint 5 0.00% (0/5) 20.00% (1/5) 20.00% (1/5) 20.00% (1/5)
others 36 5.56% (2/36) 58.82% (20/34) 8.33% (3/36) 26.47% (9/34)
No consent string found 12 16.67% (2/12) 60.00% (3/5) 0.00% (0/12) 0.00% (0/5)
all 97 6.19% (6/97) 47.06% (40/85) 11.34% (11/97) 16.47% (14/85)
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TABLE XII: Quantification of violations of the GDPR encountered in the different CMPs seen at least 5 times during the
semi-automatic crawl (on .fr, .uk, .it, .be, .ie and .com websites), by CMP. The Non-respect of choice and Pre-selected
choices columns display results w.r.t. the number of websites on which refusing consent was possible.
Number of Violations
CMP websites Consent stored before choice No way to opt out Pre-selected choices Non-respect of choice
Quantcast 174 3.4% (6/174) 5.2% (9/174) 37.8% (62/164) 0.6% (1/164)
OneTrust 50 74.0% (37/50) 4.0% (2/50) 83.3% (40/48) 8.3% (4/48)
Didomi 41 0.0% (0/41) 0.0% (0/41) 39.0% (16/41) 0.0% (0/41)
Sourcepoint 34 2.9% (1/34) 0.0% (0/34) 64.7% (22/34) 2.9% (1/34)
Evidon 22 4.5% (1/22) 22.7% (5/22) 25.0% (4/16) 25.0% (4/16)
iubenda 20 0.0% (0/20) 0.0% (0/20) 0.0% (0/20) 0.0% (0/20)
Clickio 14 0.0% (0/14) 0.0% (0/14) 0.0% (0/14) 0.0% (0/14)
Oath 12 0.0% (0/12) 0.0% (0/12) 16.7% (2/12) 0.0% (0/12)
Triboo Media 10 0.0% (0/10) 0.0% (0/10) 0.0% (0/10) 0.0% (0/10)
Commanders Act 10 40.0% (4/10) 0.0% (0/10) 80.0% (8/10) 0.0% (0/10)
Axel Springer 10 60.0% (6/10) 70.0% (7/10) 100.0% (3/3) 33.3% (1/3)
OneTag 9 0.0% (0/9) 0.0% (0/9) 100.0% (9/9) 0.0% (0/9)
Cookie Trust WG. 8 25.0% (2/8) 25.0% (2/8) 60.0% (3/5) 0.0% (0/5)
Conversant Europe 7 0.0% (0/7) 0.0% (0/7) 100.0% (7/7) 100.0% (7/7)
Ensighten 7 0.0% (0/7) 0.0% (0/7) 100.0% (7/7) 0.0% (0/7)
SIRDATA 5 0.0% (0/5) 0.0% (0/5) 0.0% (0/5) 0.0% (0/5)
Chandago 5 0.0% (0/5) 0.0% (0/5) 0.0% (0/5) 0.0% (0/5)
incorrect CMP ID 9 11.1% (1/9) 11.1% (1/9) 62.5% (5/8) 12.5% (1/8)
others 73 11.0% (8/73) 6.8% (5/73) 54.4% (37/68) 29.4% (20/68)
No consent string found 40 0.0% (0/40) 17.5% (7/40) 50.0% (11/22) 0.0% (0/22)
all 560 11.8% (66/560) 6.8% (38/560) 46.5% (236/508) 7.7% (39/508)
Claiming GDPR does not apply The URL-based consent
passing method specification [29] includes a parameter called
gdpr, used to indicate whether GDPR applies. We observe
many queries setting this parameter to 0, claiming that GDPR
does not apply. As there are many reasons for the GDPR not to
apply to a given script, we cannot decide whether such claims
are founded.
Extremely tiresome cases During our semi-automatic
crawl, we manually refused consent. Some banners were
extremely hard to configure. For instance, the one on rtl.fr
will display 8 purposes separated by lists of hundreds of
vendors, making it hard to locate the button to disable each
purpose. Furthermore, each vendor in each list is preticked,
making it extremely tiresome to disable each of them.
Ambiguity of unticked options Some banners, e.g.
Quantcast’s banner on sciencesetavenir.fr, show
unticked options when parameters are opened. However, a
negative consent is set upon saving, while a positive consent
is set if user accepts without opening the parameters. This
can lure users into thinking they have nothing to do to set
a negative consent, while they actually have to open the
parameters to do so.
No choice before acceptance Some banners, e.g. Evidon’s
banner on ticketweb.co.uk, only give the option to
define consent preferences after user has accepted tracking:
the banner only displays an “accept” button, and reveals the
parameters button once this accept button has been clicked.
Hidden parameters On some websites, parameters
to refuse consent are hidden into a long cookie policy
document linked by the cookie banner. For instance, on
liberation.fr, the link to open these parameters is hidden
in the middle of a 12 000-word-long policy document and is
visually indistinct from the rest of the text.
No implementation Some websites display a banner
of one of the TCF-affiliated CMPs, but do not implement
elements from the specification. For instance, dominos.fr
displays a classical OneTrust banner, but does not provide a
__cmp() function nor a __cmpLocator iframe. We cannot
detect these cases in our automatic crawl.
Wrong CMP id We observe the following incorrect CMP
IDs in consent strings: 1, 0 and 4095 (resp. 155, 45 and
3 websites). As of September 2nd 2019, identifiers in IAB
Europe’s public CMP list [22] range from 2 to 265. IAB
Europe stated that CMP ID 1 is incorrect and should not be
used [21], which indicates that this is clearly a violation of
the TCF. While some CMPs always return a consent string
containing an invalid CMP ID, some CMPs only do so before
users give their consent, e.g. Conversant Europe on inc.com.
Broken banner We observe banners on which either
refusing or accessing consent is not possible due to a bug
on 6 websites. Ex: olympia.ie
Consent to nonexistent vendors Some CMP set consent
for nonexistent vendors in the consent string. For instance,
CMP on mycanal.fr sets vendor IDs from 1 to 2000, even
though vendor identifiers go up to a maximum of 670 in the
GVL as of 09.2019. We observe this issue on 114 websites in
the semi-automatic crawl (20.4% of websites).
HTTP only 95 (7.2%) TCF-websites only provide an
HTTP access. It is worrisome that websites using tracking
technologies do so on an unencrypted connection.
Unusual consent verification While monitoring consent
verification made by third parties (using browser extensions to
override the __cmp() function to catch direct calls, monitor
postMessages, GET and POST queries), we observe third
parties not registered in the TCF doing so. We separate the case
where third parties are trackers according to the Disconnect
list. We observe at least one tracker unregistered in the TCF
querying the CMP to obtain consent in 43.9% of websites, and
at least one third-party unregistered in the TCF querying the
CMP to obtain consent in 55.1% of websites. It is unclear why
vendors would verify consent if they’re not registered to the
framework.
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